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I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing complexity of litigation and the increased utilization of expert witnesses to provide expensive evidence on narrow
scientific and technological issues, it is quite startling that Congress
still limits compensation of expert witnesses to only forty dollars per
day,' the same rate as that of ordinary fact witnesses.2 The Supreme
Court justified the low rate of compensation of lay witnesses by reasoning that the witness fee statute was not intended by Congress to
compensate witnesses fully for their lost time and income. 3 Presumably, this same reasoning also applies to expert witnesses. The problem
with the application of this reasoning to expert witnesses is that, unlike lay witnesses who may be compelled by subpoena to give factual
testimony, the individual litigants must pay the fees charged by the
experts. Furthermore, a plaintiff may not recoup all of his or her liti* B.S., Louisiana State University; J.D., Tulane University. Associate, Leake & Andersson, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (West Supp. 1992).
2. Id.
3. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 586 n.7 (1973) (reviewing legislative history of expert witness fee statutes), reh. denied, 411 U.S. 978 (1973).
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gation expenses after prevailing at trial if the expert witnesses have
cost more than the statutory rate of forty dollars per day.
Though this result seems inequitable, proponents of the American
Rule 4 would quickly point out that in the converse situation a losing
plaintiff is spared the costs of the defendant's expert witnesses. Thus,
to a certain extent, the plaintiff is not discouraged from pursuing a
claim that he could not otherwise afford to lose.

II.

THE LIMITATION OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES TO FORTY
DOLLARS PER DAY UNDER 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1821

The United States Supreme Court, in CrawfordFitting Co. v. J. T
Gibbons, Inc.,' reviewed 28 U.S.C. Section 1920(3)6 and concluded
that witness fees may be taxed as costs. 7 However, the amount of the
fee was limited under 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 to thirty dollars.8 This
amount has since been raised to forty dollars.' The issue in Crawford
4. Unlike the English Rule which grants a court discretion to award attorney's fees as an
element of costs in order to make the prevailing party whole, the American Rule provides that
attorney's fees are not generally allowed to the prevailing party. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (defining "American Rule"); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-49 (1975) (discussing development of "American Rule"); Arthur L.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 873 (1929) (questioning cause of differences in American
system and English common law practice). By analogy, the interdiction to recovery of attorney's fees as costs under the American Rule could be extended to bar recovery of expert witness fees.
5. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991) provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under § 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries,
fees, expenses and costs of special interpretation services under § 1828 of this title.
Id.
7. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 440-41.
8. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1821).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (Supp. 1992). Section 1821 provides: "(a)(l) Except as otherwise
provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the United States ... shall be paid the
fees and allowances provided by this section." Id. The provision further provides:
(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance. A
witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to
and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance or
at any time during such attendance.
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was whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)1 ° allowed the
court an independent means to grant expert witness fees greater than
that provided under 28 U.S.C. Section 1821.11 The Court concluded
that the rule did not provide such means and refused to allow federal
courts the discretion to award expert witness fees in excess of the statutorily prescribed amount.' 2 The decision in Crawford left open the
issue of whether the application of state law in a diversity case could
supersede the federal statute limiting witness fees.

Id.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Rule 54(d) provides in part: "Except when express provision
therefore is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Id.
11. Crawford,482 U.S. at 442. Prior to Crawford, some courts held that full expert witness fees could be awarded in excess of 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 limits if the experts were
essential. See Crues v. KFC Corp., 768 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1985) (remanding to determine
issue of whether expert is "crucial" and thus justifying award of fees); Paschall v. Kansas City
Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 326 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that district court was justified in
awarding expert fees after expert determined to be crucial); Roberts v. S. S. Kyria Koula D.
Lemos, 651 F.2d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's award of expert fees because expert's testimony was indispensable); Fahey v. Carty, 102 F.R.D. 751, 753 (D.N.J.
1983) (finding that court may tax expert fees when testimony is indispensable); Heverly v.
Lewis, 99 F.R.D. 135, 137 (D. Nev. 1983) (stating that central concern in awarding expert fees
is showing of necessity of testimony). In view of the Supreme Court's limitation in Crawford,
that courts cannot roam beyond the fee provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1821, these cases no
longer appear to be valid though they have not been directly overruled. See West Va. Univ.
Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. -, -, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1141, 113 L. Ed. 2d 68, 75 (1991)
(explicit statutory authority prerequisite to reimbursement of expert fees).
12. Exceptions to this general rule were recognized by the United States Supreme Court
when the expert witness is court-appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1920(6) and when
contract or explicit statutory authority provides for the expert's fees. Crawford, 482 U.S. at
442, 443-44. Lower courts had recognized that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, provides special statutory authority for awarding full expert
fees. See, e.g., Fiedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 517-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming district
court's award of $10,000 incurred for hiring experts to advise and testify); Coleman v. City of
Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 1983) (awarding expert witness fees); Ramos v. Lamm,
713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983) (awarding expert fees where testimony is reasonably necessary); Palmigiano v. Garraby, 707 F.2d 636, 637 (1st Cir. 1983) (awarding attorney's fees for
out-of-pocket expenses after reviewing award of expert witness fees in prior precedent); Jones
v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (remanding to district court for determination of appropriate amount of expert witness fees to award), cert. granted sub nom. Ledbetter, Sheriff v. Jones, 452 U.S. 959, and cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); cf. Wallace v.
House, 377 F. Supp. 1192, 1206-07 (W.D. La. 1974) (awarding expert witness fees in suit to
protect civil rights in at-large election), modified, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), and vacated on
othergrounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976). The Crawford opinion did not specifically address whether
it applied to awards in civil rights actions but this was resolved in West Va. Univ. Hosp., 499
U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1148, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 84-85 (1991) (holding that expert fees are not
recoverable in civil rights actions).
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STATE STATUTES-PROCEDURAL VS.
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

Whether to apply a state statute awarding expert witness fees in a
federal diversity case turns on the procedural or substantive nature of
the state statute. There is no "litmus paper" test to apply in determining whether to use state or federal law. Rather, a court must refer
to the constitutional policies of federalism underlying the rule developed in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins. 13 Erie and its progeny provide
the rule that in diversity cases, federal courts must apply state law as
established by the state's highest court.' 4 The Erie rule is rooted in
the realization that it is unfair for litigation results to differ materially
because suit is brought in federal court rather than state court.
The application of Crawford to diversity cases may cause parties
who anticipate substantial expert fees to file suit in state court when
the state has a statute awarding full expert witness fees. This result is
contrary to the policy of Erie which aims to discourage forum shopping and "inequitable administration of the laws."' 5 Moreover, the
specter of a defendant removing suit from state court to federal court
in an attempt to limit the plaintiff's recovery of expert fees should not
be countenanced.
To decide whether a state statute awarding expert witness fees is
substantive rather than procedural, a proper analysis under Hanna v.
Plumer16 is necessary. The Supreme Court in Hanna stated: "The
test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure - the judicial
13. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (requiring federal courts to
apply state law in diversity cases).
14. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (explaining Erie rule); Guaranty
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining that outcome of litigation
should be substantially same for both state and federal court where legal rules are determina-

tion of litigation's outcome). In Erie, before abandoning the established doctrine of allowing a
federal common law, the court hesitated: "We should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine

so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so." Erie, 304 U.S. at 77. See generally
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 359-64 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing constitutional basis of Erie doctrine).
15. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 46, at 275-76 (4th ed. 1983) (finding
that purpose of Erie doctrine is to prevent federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction from
entertaining claims for litigants when applicable state laws prevent state courts from doing
same); but see Chevalier v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 953 F.2d 877, 886 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that twin aims of Erie not violated by applying federal procedural provisions to taxing of
expert fees).

16. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."

7

Therefore, under Hanna, the state law is proce-

dural if it regulates how state courts enforce rights and administer
redress. 18
A statute providing for the recovery of expert witness fees does not
regulate the judicial process but simply provides a substantive right to
recover expert witness fees. An award of expert witness fees is a substantive provision under law because it operates directly to make the
aggrieved party whole by payment of money. In other words, it repairs a loss suffered. This remedy is totally unrelated to procedural
rules, which generally govern timing deadlines, forms of pleading, service of process, discovery, and trial procedure. Moreover, procedural
rules are not ordinarily thought of as directing monetary compensation to a party, as does a substantive provision for the award of expert
witness fees. Thus, a statute mandating full recovery of expert witness fees should generally be considered substantive.
Some federal district courts recognize that a state statute awarding
expert witness fees represents a substantial enough policy to justify
federal courts' awarding the fees. 19 Other district courts have not allowed state statutes to supersede the federal statute in diversity
cases.2" Inexplicably, some district courts limit expert witness fees
without first addressing whether a state statute exists that conflicts
with 28 U.S.C. Section 1821.21 Appellate cases have generally held
17. Id. at 464.
18. Id.
19. See Chemical Bank v. Kimmel, 68 F.R.D. 679, 681-82 (D. Del. 1975) (expert witness
fees awarded in accordance with state law); DeThomas v. Delta S.S. Lines, 58 F.R.D. 335,
342-43 (D.D.C. 1973) (affirming lower court's expert fees award based on state law); Henlopin
Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 155, 161 (D. Del. 1965) (stating, "A federal court, in
a diversity case should, where proper, enforce an express state policy of taxing expert witness
fees as part of costs."). The court in Henlopin Hotel found that awarding expert fees in diversity cases is appropriate. Id.
20. See Pizarro-de-Ramirez v. Grecomar Shipping Agency, 82 F.R.D. 327, 330 (D.P.R.
1976) (expressly rejecting Puerto Rican law allowing expert witness fees on grounds that rule
was "procedural" under Hanna); Thorn v. Bryant, 52 F.R.D. 25, 26-27 (W.D.N.C. 1970)
(refusing to follow North Carolina law, General Statutes § 6-52, which allowed expert witnesses fees only in court's discretion).
21. These cases do not report whether jurisdiction is based on diversity but the facts
suggest that the suits are possibly based on diversity. See Davenport Grain Co. v. Michigan
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 157, 158 (D. Neb. 1987) (limiting fees without stating
whether there is applicable Nebraska statutes concerning witness fees); Walker v. Borden, Inc.,
115 F.R.D. 471, 473 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (denying witness fees in excess of $30 per day); Warner
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that if there is an express state mandate, the expert fees are recoverable in diversity cases.22 However, the fees are not recoverable if
there is no state statute addressing the issue2 3 or if the state statute
allows recovery on a discretionary basis.24
A.

Diversity Cases Awarding Expert Witness Fees Under State
Statutes

In Henning v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District,25 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that under a
Louisiana statute26 an award of expert fees in diversity litigation "is a
substantive requirement of Louisiana law, a substantive right of the
landowners, and binding upon this Court [under] Erie. ''2 7 Recently,
the United States Supreme Court cited this case with approval.28
Though no analysis of Hanna was expressly undertaken in Henning,
the Fifth Circuit viewed the statute as substantive regardless of how it
was referred to, by stating: "This reimbursement, by whatever name
Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 424, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (limiting witness fees in
temporary restraining order case); Strong v. Ponder, 572 F. Supp. 129, 130 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(directing plaintiff to pay expert fees in amount provided for by § 1821); Murphy v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 558 F. Supp. 591, 594 (N.D. 1983) (disallowing expert fees beyond statutory limit),
aff'd, 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984); George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 985, 996 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (limiting witness fees in accordance with § 1821); Neely v.
General Elec. Co., 90 F.R.D. 627, 629-30 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (failing to state whether Georgia
statute concerning witness fees exists); Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 132, 137
(E.D. Va. 1973) (denying expert witness fees).
22. See Bright v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 844 F.2d 436, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1988) (awarding
reasonable expert witness fees notwithstanding § 1821); Henning v. Lake Charles Harbor &
Terminal Dist., 387 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1968) (awarding expert witness fees).
23. See generally Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988) (no mention by
court whether Kansas statute exists on expert witness fees), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989);
Miller v. Cudahy Co., 656 F. Supp. 316 (D. Kan. 1987) (no mention whether Kansas statute
exists on expert fees); Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 646 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1981) (no
mention by court whether New Hampshire statute exists on expert witness fees).
24. See Chaparral Resources, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 849 F.2d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1988)
(limiting expert fees after determining that Colorado can allow only discretionary award); Kivi
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying witness fees beyond § 1821 because Florida statutes insufficient to make excess award substantive right).
25. 387 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1968).
26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666A (West 1991).
27. See International Woodworkers v. Champion Int'l Co., 790 F.2d 1174, 1181 (5th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (limiting holding concerning § 1821 to non-diversity cases); cf. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987) (limiting recovery of expert fees under
§ 1821 in non-diversity cases).
28. West Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
IlI S. Ct. 1138, 1144, 113 L. Ed. 2d
68, 79 (1991).
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called or by whatever procedure handled in the state court system, is
a substantive requirement of Louisiana law." 29 Though Henning involved the condemnation and taking of property by the state which
required just compensation under the Louisiana Constitution, 30 as recently suggested in Cates v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 3'and its progeny,
the holding of Henning should not be limited to its facts.32
Henning's conclusion that the award of expert fees is a matter of
substantive state policy under the applicable state statute is correct
even without this state constitutional dimension. 33 First, a state statute rather than a court rule or the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
fixes the right to such compensation. Second, the language of the statute is mandatory.34 The mandate of its language is further evidence of
the importance of the policy established by the statute. 35 Third, Louisiana embraces the American Rule prohibiting the recovery of attorney's fees "unless provided for by law or by contract. ' 36 This
prohibition can be contrasted to the policy awarding expert witness
fees, a feature of Louisiana law since 1884. 37 For over a century, to
compensate fully a successful litigant, the Louisiana Legislature has
attached great importance to the litigant's ability to recover the cost
of expert testimony. Finally, under Hanna analysis, the mandatory
29. Henning, 387 F.2d at 267.
30. See State v. Barineau, 72 So. 2d 869, 872 (La. 1954) (stating Louisiana Constitution
"clearly contemplates that... expenses... taxed as cost should be included as an element of
...damages... where landowner's property has been taken").
31. 928 F.2d 679, 689 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. Seal v. Knorpp, 957 F.2d 1230, 1237 (5th Cir. 1992); Chevalier v. Reliance Ins. Co. of
Ill., 953 F.2d 877, 886 (5th Cir. 1992). Chevalier and Seal are cases decided by an identical
three-judge panel.
33. See Williams v. Aetna Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 192, 195 (La. 1981) (concluding Louisiana
expert witness fee statute is substantive in nature so as to make it non-retroactive); but cf.
Chevalier, 953 F.2d at 886 (noting that holding in Williams is limited to purpose of determining retroactivity and is not indicative of substantive nature under Erie).
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666A (West 1991) provides:

Witnesses called to testify in court only to an opinion founded on special study or experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations, and to
state the results thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court,
with reference to the value of time employed and the degree of learning or skill required.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. Cf People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928) (noting
state statute mandating recovery of attorney's fees).
36. Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 518 (5th Cir. 1982); Chauvin v. La Hitte, 85 So. 2d
43, 45 (1956).
37. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666, note (West 1991) (Historical and Statutory
Notes).
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award of expert fees does not regulate the procedural workings of the
court, but provides a substantive remedy of a monetary award. This
award is designed to return the aggrieved party to the financial position the party enjoyed before the lawsuit was filed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached
a conclusion similar to Henning in Bright v. Land O'Lakes, Inc.38
The appellate court affirmed an award of expert witness fees in a diversity case despite defendant's argument that the fees exceeded the
federal statutory allowance set by 28 U.S.C. Sections 182139 and
1920."0 In Bright, a dairy distributor brought suit against a dairy
processor under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law 4' after the
processor canceled his distribution contract.42 Though the court did
not employ a Hanna analysis to determine whether the statute represented a substantive requirement of state law, the court concluded
that Section 135.0643 of the Wisconsin statutes was a valid fee-shifting
statute.44
B. Diversity Cases Not Awarding Expert Witness Fees
Citing Crawford and a series of other federal cases, some circuits
seem to decree that expert witness fees in all federal court cases are
controlled by the 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 fee limitations. 45 However,
38. 844 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1988).
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (West Supp. 1992).
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
41. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-.07 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1991-92).
42. Bright, 844 F.2d at 437-38.
43. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.06 (West 1974) provides:
If any grantor violates this chapter, a dealer may bring an action against such grantor in
any court of competent jurisdiction for damages sustained by him as a consequence of the
grantor's violation, together with the actual costs of the action, including reasonable actual attorney fees, and the dealer also may be granted injunctive relief against unlawful
termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change of competitive circumstances.
Id.
44. Bright, 844 F.2d at 444. The court, relying on Esch v. Yazoo ManufacturingCo., 510
F. Supp. 53, 59 (E.D. Wis. 1981), and Kealy Pharmacy & Home Care Service Inc. v. Walgreen
Co., 607 F. Supp. 155, 170 (W.D. Wis. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 761 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1985), deemed the "actual costs" language to include expert witness fees. Bright, 844 F.2d
at 444.
45. See, e.g., Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449, 1461 (10th Cir. 1988) (denying expert
fees beyond limits of § 1821), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989); Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 695 F.2d 1285, 1289 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (limiting expert fees); Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling
Sys., 646 F.2d 689, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding "no room" for expert fees above statutory
amount).
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closer analysis reveals that the Crawford limitation is not rigidly applicable because Crawford was not a diversity case.46 When a federal
court sits in a diversity case, a different situation is presented.47 The
Supreme Court in Alyeska PipelineService v. Wilderness Society4" recognized that Erie still requires that substantive state law be applied in
diversity cases.4 9
In a recent holding denying expert witness fees in excess of the Section 1821 fee limit, the Fifth Circuit specifically noted that its ruling
was limited to nondiversity cases.50 Earlier Fifth Circuit cases do not
address this limitation and are distinguishable. For example, in Burgess v. Williamson,51 the court held that unlike Henning, which reviewed a Louisiana statute,52 the Alabama statute governing expert
witness fees did not provide for such fees to be taxed as costs. 53 In
Baum v. United States,54 the court stated that Henning was not applicable because Baum arose under the Federal Suits in Admiralty
Act. 55 Two other cases, Green v. American Tobacco Co. 56 and United
States v. Kolesar,57 arose prior to Henning and are also distinguishable
because Green involved Florida law and Kolesar involved the Federal
Torts Claims Act.5"
The Fifth Circuit's recent digression in Cates and its progeny59 fails
to provide the appropriate analysis for resolution of the issue. In
46. See Crawford, 482 U.S. at 438-39 (stating that case arose from violation of antitrust
and civil rights laws).
47. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
48. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
49. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31.
50. See International Woodworkers v. Champion Int'l Co., 790 F.2d 1174, 1181 (5th Cir.
1986) (stating, "We hold that the fees of non-court appointed witnesses are taxable by federal

courts in non-diversity cases only in the amount specified by § 1821.").
51. 506 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. See Henning v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 387 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.

1968) (reviewing LA. REV. STAT. 13:3666 concerning expert witness fees).
53. Burgess, 506 F.2d at 879-80.
54. 432 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Baum, 432 F.2d at 86.
56. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
57. 313 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1963).
58. After the Fifth Circuit split in 1981, the Eleventh Circuit in Kivi pointed out that "the
entitlement to expert witness fees under Florida statutes is not a substantive right." Kivi, 695
F.2d at 1289.
59. Seal v. Knorpp, 957 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir. 1992) (same panel as Chevalier); Chevalier v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 953 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Cates, the court mentioned but did not follow the Erie rule.' It omitted a Hanna substantive versus procedural analysis and supported its
holding by relying upon the pre-Erie decision of Henkel v. Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co.61 Henkel cannot be read
to provide a rigid rule limiting expert witness fees because the subsequent doctrine announced in Erie requires federal application of state
substantive statutes in diversity cases. Moreover, the Cates court mistakenly viewed Gerber v. Stoltenberg62 as binding precedent for the
proposition that expert witness fees in diversity cases could not exceed
statutory amounts.63 A more detailed examination reveals that
Gerber was a per curiam decision, naked of legal analysis, and based
solely upon Green.' Reliance on Green is not helpful because
although Green held that expert fees beyond the statutory amount
were not recoverable in a Florida diversity case, 65 Florida did not
have a substantive statute mandating an award of expert fees. 66
The Tenth Circuit has addressed this issue in ChaparralResources
Inc. v. Monsanto Co. ,67 where the plaintiff, in a contract dispute based
on diversity of citizenship, sued defendants who refused to pay for
seismic data useful in exploration for oil and gas.68 After trial, the
federal district court awarded the full amount of the expert witness
fees as costs on the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the award.69
The Tenth Circuit viewed 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 as limiting the expert compensation to thirty dollars per day, notwithstanding Colorado's statute that allowed expert witness fees at the discretion of the
court. 70 The court of appeals concluded that because Colorado's stat60.
61.
62.
63.

Cates, 928 F.2d at 689.
284 U.S. 444 (1932).
394 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968).
Cates, 928 F.2d at 689.

64. Gerber, 394 F.2d at 179.
65. Green, 304 F.2d at 77.
66. Florida allows expert fees at the discretion of the court. See Bystrom v. Mutual of

Omaha Ins., 566 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that Florida statues

"merely provide a mechanism" by which expert fees may be recoverable); cf. Kivi, 695 F.2d at
1289 (holding that "the entitlement to expert witness fees under the Florida statutes is not a

substantive right").
67. 849 F.2d 1286, 1292 n.7 (10th Cir. 1988).
68. Chaparral,849 F.2d at 1287-88.
69. Id. at 1291-93.
70. Chaparral,849 F.2d at 1292. The Tenth Circuit held that "Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-22102(4) does provide for additional compensation for expert witnesses; however, the determina-
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ute was discretionary rather than mandatory, the court was bound to
the limit set by 28 U.S.C. Section 1821.71 The Tenth Circuit left open
the issue of how to resolve conflicts between 28 U.S.C. Section 1821
and mandatory state statutes in diversity cases. 72 The Tenth Circuit
also questioned whether a federal court in diversity could decline to
follow a state statute mandating recovery. 3
The Tenth Circuit faced the issue again in Miller v. Cudahy.74 This
diversity action arose in Kansas where water wells of several farmers
had been polluted by salt discharges that seeped into an aquifer. 7 5
Though the Tenth Circuit analyzed the statutes and case law pertaining to other issues in the case, the court omitted any mention of
whether Kansas law provides for an award of expert witness fees.76

Instead, relying on Crawford and ChaparralResources, Inc., the court
concluded that the district court erred in awarding the expert witness
fees.7 7 Accordingly, Miller offers little help in resolving the question

of whether federal courts in diversity should follow state statutes allowing recovery of expert witness fees.
The First and Eleventh Circuits have declined to award expert fees
in diversity cases in excess of the forty dollars per day mandate of 28
U.S.C. Section 182 1.78 However, both courts have left open the question of how to resolve conflicts between substantive state statutes and
28 U.S.C. Section 1821 that develop in diversity cases. In Kivi v. Na-

tion of whether such compensation is to be awarded as costs is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.
71. Chaparral,849 F.2d at 1292.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court stated:
In Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Thepel, 609 F.2d at 1363 n.3, the panel expressly did not
consider whether a federal court sitting in diversity may, in the exercise of its discretion,
enforce an expressed state policy of assessing expert witness fees as costs. Whether a
federal court faced with a state statute authorizing the awarding of expert witness fees as
costs would have discretion to decline to follow the statute is somewhat questionable;
however, given the absence of an explicit statutory authorization in the instant case, we
need not address either that question or the question left open in Cleverock.

Id.
74. 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989).
75. Cudahy, 858 F.2d at 1451.
76. See also Miller v. Cudahy Co., 656 F. Supp. 316, 337-39 (D. Kan. 1987) (not mentioning any Kansas law on which to base award of expert's fee), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 858
F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988), and cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989).
77. Miller, 858 F.2d at 1461.
78. Kivi, 695 F.2d at 1289; Bosse, 646 F.2d at 695. At the time of these decisions, the
limit was thirty dollars per day.
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tionwide Mutual Insurance Co. ,7 the district court awarded judgment
to the plaintiff on his "bad faith" claim against his insurance company
for failure to settle a suit.80 However, the district court's award of
expert witness fees in excess of 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 was reversed.,
Though the court of appeals did not analyze the applicable Florida
statute, the court concluded that the entitlement of expert witness fees
under the Florida statute is not a substantive right.8 2 The appellate
court was careful to note that it was not departing from Henning but
was merely distinguishing Henning as a case that addressed a substan8 3
tive state statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Bosse v.
Litton Unit HandlingSystems, 84 also distinguished Henning by stating
that Henning had been decided on special facts.8 5 In Bosse, a worker
at an Anheuser-Busch bottling plant in New Hampshire fell from a
catwalk when a hanger bolt sheared and the section of the walk gave
way.8 6 The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and remanded for a new trial on grounds that the district
87
court had given deficient jury charges on the issue of negligence.
Though a new trial was ordered, the First Circuit nonetheless decided
to "make some observations" about the district court's award of substantial expert witness fees. 88 The Bosse court omitted an analysis of
the applicable New Hampshire law and did not consider whether
New Hampshire had a substantive statute to award full expert witness
fees. In dictum, the court stated that expert fees greater than the federal statute were not allowed. 9 The court saw "no reason for a different rule in diversity cases." 90 The court concluded that Henning was
either decided on special facts or was decided incorrectly. 9' The court
reasoned: "Variations between state and federal rules on costs 'do not
79. 695 F.2d 1285 (1lth Cir. 1983).
80. Id. at 1289.

81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Bystrom, 566 So. 2d at 352 (determining that award of expert fees discretionary with court).

83. Kivi, 695 F.2d at 1289.
84. 646 F.2d 689, 695 (1st Cir. 1981).
85. Bosse, 646 F.2d at 695.

86. Id. at 691.
87. Id. at 694.
88. Id. at 695.
89. Bosse, 646 F.2d at 695.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court stated, "If Henning v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District ...
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appear likely to promote forum shopping or to affect' the outcome of
the litigation 'in any significant way and therefore employing federal

law does not violate the Erie principle.'. . The federal statute must
govern."

92

Although the First Circuit states that expert witness fees are not
likely to encourage a plaintiff to select a state court forum or a defendant to remove a case to federal court, in modern litigation, payment of
expert fees may be a sufficient enough factor to promote forum
shopping.

93

IV.

ANALOGY TO AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES IN
DIVERSITY CASES

Expert witness fees should be fully recoverable in diversity litigation if one accepts the analogous reasoning by which the United
States Supreme Court recognized the propriety of recovering attorney's fees in diversity cases despite federal statutes which otherwise
would limit their recovery in federal court.94 The analogy is appropriate because these statutes also originated in the Fee Bill of 1853. 9'
The Supreme Court has not interpreted statutes emanating from the
1853 Fee Bill to prohibit awards of attorney's fees in diversity cases:
A very different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a
diversity case. "[I]n an ordinary diversity case where the state law does
not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court, and usually it
will not, state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right
thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be followed." Prior to the decision in Erie ...this Court held that a state
statute requiring an award of attorneys' fees should be applied in a case
removed from the state courts to the federal courts .... The limitations
holds any differently, which we doubt, rather than being decided on special facts, we do not
follow it." Id.
92. Id. (citing 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2669, at 153 (1973)).
93. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 338 (8th Cir. 1982)
($312,932.28 expert witness fees awarded); Kaiser Ind. Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 50
F.R.D. 5, 13 (E.D. Mich. 1970) ($66,316.51 expert fees not taxable in excess of statutory
witness fees).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1966) (limiting recovery of expert witness fees).
95. See International Woodworkers v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1821 originated in Fee Bill of 1853), aff'd sub
nom. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 255 (1975) (noting that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and
1923(a) originated in Fee Bill of 1853).
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on the awards of attorney'sfees by federal courts derivingfrom the 1853
Act were found not to bar the award.
We see nothing after Erie requir96
result.
this
from
ing a departure
Since the prohibitions concerning attorney's fees and expert fees both
derive from the 1853 Fee Bill, 28 U.S.C. Section 1821 should not be
likewise interpreted to prohibit awards of expert fees in diversity
cases.

97

It would be hard to overstate the importance of the distinction
drawn in footnote thirty-one of Alyeska between federal question and
diversity litigation. It must be remembered that one of the principal
purposes of the 1853 Fee Bill "was to limit allowance for attorney's
fees that were to be charged to losing parties. ' 98 For example, counsel fees collectible from the losing party were expressly limited to the
amounts stated in the Act: ". . . in lieu of the compensation now
allowed by law to attorneys ...in the United States courts, to United
States district attorneys, clerks ... marshals, witnesses ... the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed." 99
Although the Fee Bill has subsequently been carried forward as
several different federal statutes,"° the Supreme Court stated that the
recodifications indicate no congressional intent to depart from the
original rule. 10 1 Thus, the general rule is that "federal courts cannot
award attorney's fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. Section 1923. "1 2
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged in International Woodworkers v.
Champion International Co. 103 that the "American Rule of limited
recovery [which] . .. is equally applicable in the context of excess
expert witness fees" has the same doctrinal and statutory origin as the
provisions limiting the recovery of attorney's fees. 1' All of these pro-

96. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31 (emphasis added).
97. Id.; see also International Woodworkers, 790 F.2d at 1178 (emphasis added) (stating,
"The Court's reasoning in Alyeska in the analogous area of attorney's fees further compels our
conclusion that expert witness' fees are generally not recoverable beyond the amount specified
by statute .... ).
98. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 252.
99. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 1853 Act that regulated awards of witness fees).
100. Id. at 253-57.
101. Id. at 255-56 n.29.
102. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269.
103. 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
104. International Woodworkers, 790 F.2d at 1177.
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visions find their origins in the Fee Bill of 1853.105
Furthermore, in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote with specific reference to Alyeska that the analysis of attorney and expert fees
under the 1853 Fee Bill is "similar":
The comprehensive scope of the Act and the particularity with which it
was drafted demonstrated to us that Congress meant to impose rigid
controls on cost-shifting in federal courts. Thus, [in Alyeska] we rejected an argument similar to the one posited by petitioners today:
"Nor has [Congress] extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to
allow counsel fees as costs
or otherwise whenever the courts might
'0 6
deem them warranted."'
Though often cited in Crawfordand International Woodworkers for
the proposition that the federal courts have no "roving authority" to
shift costs, Alyeska also stated expressly that "[a] very different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a diversity case."'' 0 7 Importantly, in Alyeska, the Court reasoned that Hanna did not require
a "departure from this result." Rather, a substantial state rule on feeshifting may be applied in diversity litigation.1l0
The Alyeska Court's analysis of the 1853 Fee Bill and its legislative
history shows that Congress intended to impose as rigid controls on
the awarding of attorney's fees as those imposed on the costs of witnesses. It is likely that in 1853 Congress was more concerned with the
awarding of attorney's fees than with witness fees because Congress
was not faced with the substantial fees of modern expert witnesses.10 9
In view of Alyeska's footnote thirty-one, which recognizes that the
federal court limitations on both attorney's and expert witness fees
emanated from the same source, there is no principled basis for having one rule in diversity litigation for attorney's fees and an altogether
different rule for expert fees.
There is another ground for awarding full expert fees in a diversity
case if a state statute makes such a provision. Expert witness fees are
not regarded as the usual small costs of court but, like attorney's fees,
105.
106.
107.
108.
Hanna v.

Id.
Crawford, 482 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added) (quoting Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260).
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31.
See id. (stating, "We see nothing after Erie requiring a departure from this result.");
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965).

109. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 251 n.24 (quoting Senator Bradbury's remarks during Senate debate on Fee Bill). The Senator reasoned, "The abuses that have grown up in the taxation
of attorney's fees have been a matter of serious complaint." Id.
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are more substantial. In People of Sioux County v. National Surety
Company,1 ' a diversity case involving the recovery of attorney's fees
in federal court, the Supreme Court held that an award of attorney's
fees under a Nebraska statute,
to be added to the judgment as costs are added does not make it costs in
the ordinary sense of the traditional, arbitrary and small fees of court
..allowed to counsel by [the federal costs statutes]. The present allowance, since it is not costs in the ordinary sense, is not within the field
of costs legislation covered by [the federal statutes]."l'
Expert fees are no more "costs in the ordinary sense" than attorney's
fees were in People of Sioux County. Therefore, expert fees are "not
within the field of costs legislation covered by [the federal

statutes]." 112

The need for experts is critical in many of today's trials. As Judge
Rubin observed in Jones v. Diamond: 3 "Counsel must have the
assistance of experts to furnish effective and competent representation .... [E]xpert testimony is a vital ingredient in the proper presentation and decision of a case."1 " 4 That being so, it is difficult to see
any justifiable basis to distinguish, for the purposes of Erie, between a
mandatory requirement concerning attorney's fees and an analogous
requirement concerning the compensation of experts."' Both requirements should be enforced so long as the threshold requirement
of substantiality is satisfied.
V.

CONCLUSION

The award in diversity cases of expert witness fees over the forty
dollars per day allowed by federal statute presents a classic Erie problem and requires Hanna analysis for proper resolution. If a substan110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

276 U.S. 238 (1928).
243- 44.
Id.
636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1382.

Id. at

115. See People of Sioux County, 276 U.S. at 242- 43 (finding that state statutory awards
of attorney's fees should not be thwarted because of removal to federal court); cf Chaparral
Resources Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 849 F.2d 1286, 1292 n.7 (10th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that
because expert fees are discretionary in Colorado, state statute is "not tantamount to an express statutory mandate" and does not present problems under Erie). The court implied, however, that a different result may occur in cases involving "expressed state policy of assessing
expert witness fees as costs." Id.; see also Bright v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 844 F.2d 436, 444 (7th
Cir. 1988) (applying Wisconsin law to award full expert fees).
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tive state statute exists, it must be applied. The appellate courts
addressing this issue have generally held that if a state expressly mandates the award of full expert witness fees, the fees will be recoverable
unless the state statute is merely discretionary. Award of these expert
witness fees is consonant with the United States Supreme Court's
analogous policy in Alyeska which would allow attorney's fees in diversity cases.
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